- Key Takeaways
- Introduction
- The Law That Decides a Divorce Financial Settlement
- How Courts Divide Assets: Needs, Sharing and Compensation
- Why You Need a Financial Order Even After the Final Divorce Order
- Consent Orders: Turning an Agreement into a Court Order
- The Contested Process: From MIAM to Final Hearing
- Pensions in Brief
- Prenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements Under the Current Law
- Proposals, Not Law: What the "A Fairer End to Relationships" Consultation Would Change
- What a Financial Settlement Costs
- How Can WPC Lawyers Help?
- Conclusion
- Glossary
- Frequently Asked Questions
Key Takeaways
- There is no automatic 50/50 split in a divorce settlement. Under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, the court looks at all the circumstances, gives first consideration to the welfare of any child of the family under 18, and aims for a fair outcome, which is not the same thing as a fixed share.
- Equal division is the starting point for assets built up during the marriage, but meeting needs comes first in most cases. Since White v White [2000] UKHL 54, a judge is "well advised" to check any division against the "yardstick of equality", and equality should be departed from only for good reason, but Lord Nicholls said in Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 that in most cases "the search for fairness largely begins and ends" with meeting both parties' housing and financial needs.
- Inherited, gifted and pre-marriage assets are not normally shared, but they can still be used to meet needs. In Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26 (2 July 2025), the Supreme Court held that the sharing principle applies only to matrimonial property, that whose name an asset is in does not decide the point, and that non-matrimonial property becomes shared only where the couple have treated it as shared over time.
- A final divorce order does not end financial claims between you. There is no time limit for a spouse to apply for a financial order after divorce, as the Supreme Court confirmed in Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14, where the wife applied in 2011 after a 1992 divorce. A court order with a clean break is the usual way to close claims for good.
- Remarrying before you apply can end your own claim. Under section 28(3) of the 1973 Act, a person who remarries or forms a civil partnership after the divorce cannot then apply for a financial provision order in their own favour, or for a property adjustment order, against their former spouse.
- An agreement is not legally binding until a judge approves it as a consent order. GOV.UK states the court cannot approve a consent order before the conditional order, the order only takes effect once the final order is made, and applying after the final order may have financial consequences, particularly for pensions.
- If you cannot agree, the court process is set by Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules. You must attend a MIAM first unless an exemption applies, then file Form A; the court fixes a first appointment 12 to 16 weeks later, Form E disclosure is exchanged at least 35 days before it, and the court must then refer the case to an FDR appointment unless there are exceptional reasons not to.
- The reason for the divorce does not change the financial outcome. GOV.UK states the reason for the divorce is not taken into account, and case law sets the bar for conduct under section 25(2)(g) very high.
- Prenuptial agreements are not automatically binding today. Under Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, the court gives effect to an agreement freely entered into with a full appreciation of its implications, unless it would not be fair to hold the parties to it.
- The reform proposals have not changed the law. The Ministry of Justice consultation "A fairer end to relationships" ran from 5 June to 14 August 2026 and proposes putting needs and sharing into statute and making qualifying nuptial agreements binding. As at 24 September 2026 the government has not published its response, so every case today is decided under the current law.
- WPC Lawyers acts on financial remedy cases from disclosure to final hearing. Our financial proceedings service covers Form E disclosure, negotiation, consent order drafting and court applications, with published fixed fees on our fees page.
Introduction
When a marriage ends, the divorce itself and the money are two separate legal processes. The divorce dissolves the marriage. The financial settlement decides who keeps the home, how savings, investments and pensions are divided, and whether one of you will pay maintenance to the other. Many people finish the first process and assume the second is finished too. It is not.
This guide explains how a divorce financial settlement is decided in England and Wales as at 24 September 2026: the statute the court applies, the principles judges have built on top of it, how a consent order differs from a contested application, and each stage of the court process. The law described here applies to England and Wales only. Scotland has its own statutory scheme under the Family Law (Scotland) Act 1985, and Northern Ireland has its own legislation, so neither is covered here.
It also covers the reform proposals. In June 2026 the Ministry of Justice published a consultation that would, if taken forward, put the court's main principles into statute and make some nuptial agreements binding. That consultation closed on 14 August 2026 and, at the date of writing, the government has not published its response. We keep the proposals in their own clearly labelled section so that nothing in them is mistaken for the current law.
Everything below applies equally to civil partners on dissolution. The Civil Partnership Act 2004 mirrors the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, and the Supreme Court confirmed in Standish that the same principles apply. If you are still at the stage of starting the divorce itself, our divorce and dissolution service deals with that process.
The Law That Decides a Divorce Financial Settlement
The court's powers come from the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Sections 23 and 24 allow the court, on making a divorce order or at any time after it, to order maintenance (called periodical payments), lump sums and transfers of property. Section 24A adds the power to order a sale, and section 24B adds pension sharing orders. As GOV.UK puts it, a financial order "will only take effect after you get your final order".
How the court uses those powers is governed by section 25. Section 25(1) requires the court to have regard to all the circumstances of the case, first consideration being given to the welfare of any child of the family under 18. Section 25(2) then lists the matters the court must particularly consider for each spouse. The statute does not rank them. Their weight depends on the facts of the case.
| Section 25(2) | What the court must consider |
|---|---|
| (a) | Each party's income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources, now and in the foreseeable future, including any increase in earning capacity it would be reasonable to expect them to acquire |
| (b) | Each party's financial needs, obligations and responsibilities, now and in the foreseeable future |
| (c) | The standard of living the family enjoyed before the marriage broke down |
| (d) | The age of each party and the duration of the marriage |
| (e) | Any physical or mental disability of either party |
| (f) | The contributions each has made or is likely to make to the welfare of the family, including looking after the home or caring for the family |
| (g) | The conduct of each party, if it would be inequitable for the court to disregard it |
| (h) | The value of any benefit, such as a pension, that a party will lose the chance of acquiring because of the divorce |
Two further duties shape almost every settlement. Section 25A requires the court to consider whether the parties' financial obligations to each other can be ended as soon after the divorce as is just and reasonable, which is the statutory basis of the "clean break". Where maintenance is ordered, the court must consider whether it should run only for a set term, long enough for the receiving party to adjust without undue hardship.
Child maintenance is usually dealt with separately. In most cases it falls within the jurisdiction of the Child Maintenance Service rather than the court, although it can be included in an agreed order.
How Courts Divide Assets: Needs, Sharing and Compensation
Section 25 tells the court what to look at, but not what outcome to aim for. That gap has been filled by the courts. The Ministry of Justice's own consultation document describes the current law as requiring the court to "refer to both statute and case law", and three decisions of the highest court do most of the work.
White v White: fairness and the yardstick of equality
In White v White [2000] UKHL 54, a farming couple divorced after 33 years. Lord Nicholls, giving the leading speech, held that the objective is a fair outcome and that "there is no place for discrimination between husband and wife and their respective roles". The contribution of the spouse who ran the home and raised the children is not worth less than that of the spouse who earned the money.
He then set out the check that still applies. Before making an order, a judge "would always be well advised to check his tentative views against the yardstick of equality of division", and "equality should be departed from only if, and to the extent that, there is good reason for doing so". He added in the same passage that this was "not to introduce a presumption of equal division under another guise". White also ended the old practice of capping the financially weaker spouse's award at their "reasonable requirements" where there was more than enough to go round.
Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane: the three strands
In Miller v Miller; McFarlane v McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24, the House of Lords identified three strands of fairness: needs, compensation and sharing.
On needs, Lord Nicholls said that "in most cases the search for fairness largely begins and ends at this stage", because in most cases "the available assets are insufficient to provide adequately for the needs of two homes". On sharing, he said that when the marriage partnership ends each is entitled to an equal share of its assets "unless there is a good reason to the contrary", and that "the yardstick of equality is to be applied as an aid, not a rule". Compensation addresses a significant economic disparity caused by the way the couple arranged their lives, for example where one gave up a career to care for the children.
Standish v Standish: what is shared and what is not
Until 2025 it was unclear whether assets one spouse brought into the marriage, or inherited during it, could be shared under the sharing principle. In Standish v Standish [2025] UKSC 26, decided on 2 July 2025, the Supreme Court settled the point. The case concerned assets, worth about £80 million by the time of the hearing, that the husband had transferred into the wife's name in 2017 as part of an inheritance tax plan, with the intention that trusts would be set up for the children.
The court held that:
- the distinction between matrimonial and non-matrimonial property turns on the source of the asset, not on whose name it is in;
- non-matrimonial property (typically assets owned before the marriage, or inherited or gifted from outside it) is not subject to the sharing principle, although it can still be used to meet needs or compensation;
- matrimonial property should normally be shared equally, which is "the appropriate and principled starting position";
- non-matrimonial property can become matrimonial ("matrimonialisation") where the parties have, over time, treated the asset as shared between them; and
- a transfer between spouses made to save tax does not normally show that the asset is being treated as shared.
On the facts, the Court of Appeal's assessment that 75% of the £80 million remained the husband's non-matrimonial property was upheld, and the wife's appeal was dismissed.
| Principle | Where it comes from | What it does | How it applies in practice |
|---|---|---|---|
| Needs | Section 25(2)(b); Miller; McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 | Provides for each party's housing and income, and the children's, as far as resources allow | Decides most cases, because most couples do not have enough to fund two homes comfortably |
| Sharing | White v White [2000] UKHL 54; Standish [2025] UKSC 26 | Divides matrimonial property, with equal division as the starting point | Matters where assets exceed both parties' needs; applies only to matrimonial property |
| Compensation | Miller; McFarlane [2006] UKHL 24 | Redresses economic disadvantage caused by how the marriage was organised | Rarely applied; the MoJ consultation describes it as rarely used by the courts |
So is it 50/50?
Sometimes, but not as of right. Where the matrimonial assets are more than enough to meet both parties' needs, equal division of those assets is the starting point and the court needs a good reason to depart from it. Where they are not enough, which the House of Lords recognised is the position in most cases, the court divides what there is to meet needs, starting with the children's housing. The result can be well away from half in either direction. Assets from outside the marriage are dealt with separately again after Standish. No two cases are the same, and no one can tell you your share without knowing your full financial picture.
Does the reason for the divorce matter?
Generally not. GOV.UK states plainly that "the reason for the divorce or dissolution is not taken into account". Conduct is a section 25 factor, but only where it would be inequitable to disregard it, and the courts have set that threshold very high. In Miller, Lord Nicholls traced the modern approach back to Wachtel v Wachtel, which confined relevant misconduct to cases where it was "obvious and gross". Financial misconduct is treated differently. The Ministry of Justice consultation paper notes that case law also recognises the wanton and reckless dissipation of assets, litigation misconduct and a failure to give full and frank disclosure as forms of misconduct.
Why You Need a Financial Order Even After the Final Divorce Order
The final order ends the marriage. It does not end the financial claims that arise from it. Unless those claims are dealt with by a court order, either spouse can in principle apply for a financial order later.
In Wyatt v Vince [2015] UKSC 14, the couple divorced in 1992. The wife applied for a financial order in 2011. By the time the case reached the Supreme Court, her former husband's company was worth at least £57 million. The Supreme Court held that "there is no time-limit for seeking orders for financial provision or property adjustment for the benefit of a spouse following divorce", allowed her appeal against the striking out of her claim, and directed that it go to an FDR appointment. Lord Wilson made clear that delay would be looked at critically and could reduce or even eliminate an award, but the claim itself was still open almost two decades after the divorce.
The consultation paper confirms the government does not propose to introduce time limits for spouses, citing Wyatt v Vince. So the risk of a late claim is part of the current law and would stay that way under the proposals.
There is one important exception that works the other way. Under section 28(3), a person who remarries or forms a civil partnership after the divorce is not entitled to apply for a financial provision order in their own favour, or for a property adjustment order, against their former spouse. If you intend to remarry, the timing of your own financial application matters.
The way to close claims permanently is a financial order that includes a clean break, which dismisses both parties' income and capital claims against each other. Whether a clean break is appropriate depends on the case. Where one party needs ongoing maintenance, the court may order payments for a fixed term instead.
| Consent order | Contested financial order | |
|---|---|---|
| Starting point | You have reached agreement, through negotiation, mediation or solicitors | You cannot agree on some or all issues |
| MIAM required first? | No. Practice Direction 3A excludes consent order applications from the MIAM requirement | Yes, unless an exemption under FPR rule 3.8 applies |
| What is filed | Draft order signed by both parties, a statement of information (Form D81) and a notice of application (Form A) | Form A, followed by Form E financial statements from both parties |
| Hearing? | Usually none. Rule 9.26(4) FPR means the parties need not attend unless the court directs | A first appointment, usually an FDR appointment, and a final hearing if no settlement |
| Who decides | The judge approves the agreement, and can ask you to change it if it does not appear fair | The judge decides if you do not settle |
| When it takes effect | Only after the final order | Only after the final order |
Consent Orders: Turning an Agreement into a Court Order
GOV.UK is direct on this: "If your agreement is not legally binding, a court cannot enforce it if there are any issues later." An agreement reached across a kitchen table, or recorded in a mediation summary, cannot be enforced as a court order, and it does not stop either of you applying to the court, although a court may give weight to an agreement that was freely made. It becomes legally binding once a judge approves it as a consent order.
To apply, the applicant files two copies of the draft order, one signed by the other party to show agreement, and each party files a statement of information setting out their financial circumstances (FPR rule 9.26). Section 33A of the 1973 Act lets the court make the order on the basis of that information alone, unless it has reason to inquire further. There is usually no hearing. The judge is not a rubber stamp, though: if the terms do not appear fair, the court can ask you to change them.
GOV.UK's guidance on applying for a consent order sets out the timing. The court cannot approve a consent order before the conditional order. It is usually simpler to apply before the final order, because applying after it "may" have financial consequences, "particularly for pensions". The order takes effect only once the final order is made.
A consent order must be drafted precisely. It needs to record every term that is meant to be binding, deal with the family home, pensions and any maintenance, and state clearly whether claims are dismissed. A poorly drafted order can leave claims open, which defeats much of its purpose. Our mediation support service covers turning an agreement reached in mediation into a consent order.
The Contested Process: From MIAM to Final Hearing
If you cannot agree, either of you can ask the court to decide. Financial remedy applications are made in the Family Court under Part 9 of the Family Procedure Rules (FPR), which apply to applications issued on or after 6 April 2022. An application can be made with the divorce application or at any time after it (rule 9.4). The table below uses only the time limits set by the rules themselves.
| Stage | What happens | Rule and time limit |
|---|---|---|
| MIAM | A short meeting with an authorised family mediator to consider mediation and other non-court options. The other party is expected to attend too | Section 10 Children and Families Act 2014; FPR rules 3.6 to 3.8 and Practice Direction 3A. PD3A says a MIAM should be held within 15 business days of contacting the mediator |
| Form A | The application for a financial order, which must confirm MIAM attendance or claim an exemption | Form A (updated 21 July 2026); FPR rule 3.7 |
| Court issues the application | The court fixes the date of the first appointment and serves the application | Rule 9.12: first appointment not less than 12 and not more than 16 weeks after filing. GOV.UK says it is usually 12 to 14 weeks |
| Form E | Both parties exchange sworn financial statements with supporting documents, at the same time | Rule 9.14(1): not less than 35 days before the first appointment |
| Pre-appointment documents | Each party files a concise statement of issues, a chronology and a questionnaire asking for further information | Rule 9.14(5): not less than 14 days before the first appointment |
| First Directions Appointment | The judge defines the issues, decides which questions must be answered, and gives directions on valuations and expert evidence. Both parties must attend unless the court directs otherwise | Rules 9.15 and 9.16 |
| FDR appointment | A without prejudice appointment which the rules say must be treated as a meeting for discussion and negotiation, to help you agree without a final hearing. The FDR judge then takes no further part in the case except to make a consent order or further directions | Rule 9.15(4): the court must refer the case to an FDR unless there are exceptional reasons. Rule 9.17: offers filed at least 7 days before; both parties must use their best endeavours to agree |
| Open proposals | If the FDR does not settle the case, each party sets out an open proposal | Rule 9.27A: within 21 days after the FDR unless the court directs otherwise; rule 9.28: open statements before the final hearing |
| Final hearing | The judge hears evidence and decides the order | Directions given under rule 9.17(9) |
GOV.UK's guidance on asking the court to decide is candid that timescales depend on how many FDR appointments are needed and whether a final hearing is required, and that "there can be several months between the appointments". Our financial proceedings service handles each of these stages.
If there has been domestic abuse
Domestic abuse, including economic abuse such as controlling access to money or running up debt in the other person's name, changes some of the practical steps. Evidence of domestic abuse is an exemption from the MIAM requirement under FPR rule 3.8(1)(a), and GOV.UK states that legal aid may be available to help with court costs in certain situations, for example if you are separating from an abusive partner. The free, 24-hour National Domestic Abuse Helpline is on 0808 2000 247. If you need protection from the court, our non-molestation order service explains how that route works alongside financial proceedings.
Pensions in Brief
Pensions are often among the largest assets in a divorce and are easy to overlook. The court can make a pension sharing order under section 24B of the 1973 Act, which transfers a percentage of one party's pension into a pension for the other. A pension sharing order cannot take effect until the divorce is made final. This is one reason GOV.UK advises that financial orders are usually simpler to obtain before the final order. Valuing and dividing pensions is a subject of its own, and we will cover it in a separate guide.
Prenuptial and Postnuptial Agreements Under the Current Law
Nuptial agreements are not automatically binding in England and Wales. Their status comes from case law. In Radmacher v Granatino [2010] UKSC 42, decided on 20 October 2010, the majority of the Supreme Court set out the test that still applies to both prenuptial and postnuptial agreements:
"The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that is freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless in the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement."
Several limits follow from the judgment. An agreement cannot be allowed to prejudice the reasonable requirements of any children of the family. Needs and compensation are the strands most likely to make it unfair to hold a party to an agreement: the court said the parties were unlikely to have intended that one of them would be left "in a predicament of real need" while the other enjoys a sufficiency or more. Where each party can meet their needs, the agreement is most likely to govern how assets are shared. Duress, fraud, misrepresentation or undue pressure can remove or reduce its weight.
In short, a well-prepared agreement can carry decisive weight, but the court keeps the final say. That uncertainty is exactly what the reform proposals set out to change.
Proposals, Not Law: What the "A Fairer End to Relationships" Consultation Would Change
Everything in this section is a proposal. None of it is law.
The Ministry of Justice published the consultation "A fairer end to relationships" on 5 June 2026. It ran until 11:59pm on 14 August 2026. It follows the Law Commission's scoping report on financial remedies, published on 18 December 2024, which concluded that the current law lacks certainty and accessibility and that it is "not possible for an individual going through divorce to understand, by reading the statute, how their case will be decided".
We checked the consultation page on 24 September 2026. It is marked as closed, with the note "We are analysing your feedback". The government has not published its response. The consultation document itself says the proposals are "not draft legislative text" and that any legislation "will be introduced when parliamentary time allows". Nothing about how a financial settlement is decided has changed.
The "codification-plus" model
The government proposes a "codification-plus" model. Settled case law principles would be written into statute, with targeted reforms where the law is uncertain. The proposals for divorce include:
- an overarching objective of a fair outcome achieved through the principles of sharing and needs;
- sharing as the starting point, with the court turning to needs only where equal sharing would not meet them;
- statutory definitions of matrimonial and non-matrimonial property, reflecting the Supreme Court's approach in Standish, including the court considering how property has been used, shared and treated over time;
- a three-stage approach to needs: children's needs first, then each party's capital and income needs including housing and pensions, then "discretionary needs" where resources allow, all measured against the standard of living during the marriage;
- compensation removed as a standalone principle and added instead as a new factor in the section 25 list, covering economic disadvantage suffered during the marriage;
- a specific duty on the court to consider pensions accrued during the marriage; and
- codifying the existing principle that seamless cohabitation before marriage can count towards the length of the marriage.
Qualifying nuptial agreements
The most significant change would be to prenuptial and postnuptial agreements. The government "plans to include qualifying nuptial agreements as part of its reforms". A qualifying agreement would be binding, subject to proposed safeguards: it would have to be a valid contract, made by deed with a signed statement that both parties understand its effect, made at least 28 days before the wedding or civil partnership, and made after each party received material financial disclosure and independent legal advice. Neither disclosure nor advice could be waived. An agreement could not be used to opt out of children's needs, and the court could still depart from it to meet a party's needs, assessed on a narrower basis that excludes discretionary needs.
Domestic abuse and conduct
The consultation asks whether domestic abuse, including economic abuse, should be taken into account more readily when assets are divided. It does not make a firm proposal on this. It asks open questions, says the so-called "gasp factor" test for misconduct is an inappropriate way of describing the threshold, and states that the reasons for a breakdown, such as adultery, should not be relevant.
What the government does not propose to change
The consultation states the government has concluded that reform is not needed on restricting spousal maintenance, on financial provision for children over 18, or on introducing limitation periods for claims between spouses. The same consultation proposes a separate new framework for cohabiting couples who separate, which is a different subject and does not affect married couples or civil partners.
| Issue | Current law (in force) | Proposal (not in force) |
|---|---|---|
| Source of the rules | Section 25 MCA 1973 plus case law (White, Miller; McFarlane, Standish) | Needs and sharing written into statute ("codification-plus") |
| Sharing | Matrimonial property only, equal division the starting point (Standish, 2 July 2025) | Same principle, with statutory definitions of matrimonial and non-matrimonial property |
| Needs | Assessed under section 25 and case law; not defined in statute | A three-stage statutory test: children, then housing, income and pensions, then discretionary needs |
| Compensation | A separate case law principle, rarely applied | A factor in the section 25 list rather than a principle |
| Pensions | Considered as part of all the resources | A specific duty to consider pensions accrued during the marriage |
| Nuptial agreements | Given effect unless unfair (Radmacher, 20 October 2010) | Qualifying agreements binding, subject to safeguards and a narrower needs test |
| Time limits for spouses | None (Wyatt v Vince, 2015) | No change proposed |
What this means if you are separating now
Any settlement you negotiate or any order the court makes today is decided under the current law. If you are considering a prenuptial or postnuptial agreement now, Radmacher governs how it will be treated, and taking independent legal advice and giving full financial disclosure remain the best way to give it weight. We will update this guide when the government publishes its response.
What a Financial Settlement Costs
Costs depend on whether you agree or the court decides, how many FDR appointments are needed and whether there is a final hearing. Court fees for both routes are set out in GOV.UK's guide to money and property when you divorce or separate, which also explains help with court fees. Our own fixed fees for family matters are published on our fees page.
How Can WPC Lawyers Help?
WPC Lawyers is a firm of solicitors authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. Our financial proceedings team advises on divorce financial settlements under the current law, from full financial disclosure and Form E through negotiation, consent order drafting, FDR appointments and final hearings, and on enforcing or varying existing orders. Where agreement is possible, our mediation support service helps you reach it and record it in a consent order.
Every settlement turns on its own facts, so we start by understanding your finances and your priorities, then explain the options and the realistic range of outcomes. You can see all our family law services and our published fixed fees before you contact us.
| Get in touch with our team via our contact page. 📞 Call us: 020 3633 0909 📧 Email: info@wpclawyers.co.uk 📅 Book an appointment: wpclawyers.co.uk/contact#appointment 💷 See our fixed fees: wpclawyers.co.uk/fees WPC Lawyer Limited is authorised and regulated by the Solicitors Regulation Authority, SRA number 8003128. |
Conclusion
A divorce financial settlement in England and Wales is decided under section 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 and the principles the courts have built on it. Children's welfare comes first. Most cases are decided on needs. Where there is more than enough to meet needs, matrimonial property is usually shared equally, and since Standish, assets from outside the marriage are not shared unless the couple treated them as shared.
The practical points matter as much as the principles. An agreement is not legally binding until a court approves it as a consent order, and a final divorce order leaves financial claims open, potentially for decades, unless an order closes them. The reform proposals would make the rules clearer and make some nuptial agreements binding, but as at 24 September 2026 they remain proposals, and today's cases are decided under today's law.
Glossary
| Term | Definition |
|---|---|
| Financial remedy | The general term for the orders the court can make about money and property on divorce or dissolution. Also called a financial order |
| Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 | The Act that gives the court its powers to make financial orders on divorce in England and Wales |
| Section 25 factors | The list in section 25(2) of the 1973 Act of matters the court must particularly consider, such as income, needs, age and contributions |
| Conditional order | The first of the two divorce orders. The court cannot approve a consent order before it is made. Formerly called a decree nisi |
| Final order | The order that legally ends the marriage. Financial orders take effect only after it. Formerly called a decree absolute |
| Consent order | A court order setting out financial arrangements the parties have agreed, which makes the agreement legally binding |
| Clean break | An order that ends both parties' financial claims against each other, so neither can make a further claim later |
| Periodical payments | Regular maintenance payments from one party to the other, also called spousal maintenance |
| Lump sum order | An order that one party pays the other a specific sum of money |
| Property adjustment order | An order transferring property, such as the family home, from one party to the other |
| Pension sharing order | An order transferring a percentage of one party's pension into a pension for the other |
| MIAM | Mediation Information and Assessment Meeting. A meeting with a mediator you must usually attend before applying to court |
| Form A | The form used to apply to court for a financial order |
| Form E | The sworn financial statement each party completes, setting out income, assets, debts, pensions and needs |
| Statement of information (Form D81) | The form each party files with a consent order application to give the court a summary of their finances |
| First Directions Appointment | The first court hearing in a contested case, where the judge defines the issues and gives directions |
| FDR appointment | Financial Dispute Resolution appointment. A without prejudice court appointment, treated as a meeting for discussion and negotiation, to help the parties settle |
| Without prejudice | Discussions and offers that cannot later be used as evidence against the person who made them |
| Needs principle | The principle that each party's housing and income needs, and the children's, should be met as far as resources allow |
| Sharing principle | The principle that matrimonial property should be divided, usually equally unless there is good reason to depart |
| Compensation principle | The principle that redresses economic disadvantage caused by how the marriage was organised |
| Matrimonial property | Property that is the fruit of the marriage partnership or the product of the parties' common endeavour |
| Non-matrimonial property | Typically property owned before the marriage, or inherited or gifted from outside it |
| Matrimonialisation | The process by which non-matrimonial property becomes matrimonial because the couple treated it as shared over time |
| Conduct | Behaviour the court takes into account only where it would be inequitable to disregard it, a very high threshold |
| Nuptial agreement | A prenuptial (before marriage) or postnuptial (after marriage) agreement about dividing finances on divorce |
| Qualifying nuptial agreement | A proposed type of binding nuptial agreement that would have to meet statutory safeguards. Not yet law |
| Codification-plus | The proposed reform model that would write existing case law principles into statute with targeted changes. Not yet law |
